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Abstract 
In this paper efficiency gains and associated cost reductions from increases in traded quota are 
estimated with a stochastic cost frontier for the Australian South East Trawl Fishery (SETF). 
Estimation of this frontier also provides key information on the relative importance of input costs in 
the SETF, returns to scale, variations in costs as a result of trade in quota and the economic 
performance of each fishing vessel, year to year. Final estimations indicate that increases in the 
volume of quota traded have resulted in considerable efficiency gains and cost reductions in the 
SETF, ranging from 1.8 to 3.5 cents per kilogram for surveyed vessels for every one per cent 
increase in the volume of quota traded, or 1 to 2.4 per cent of total variable costs, with 
considerable gains also accruing to crew and skipper in the form of larger share payments. Mean 
vessel efficiency is relatively high in the SETF, estimated at over 90 per cent, and increases 
further to 92 per cent over the sample period with increased trades in quota. 
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Abstract
In this paper eﬃciency gains and associated cost reductions from in-
creases in traded quota are estimated with a stochastic cost frontier for the
Australian South East Trawl Fishery (SETF). Estimation of this frontier
also provides key information on the relative importance of input costs in
the SETF, returns to scale, variations in costs as a result of trade in quota
and the economic performance of each ﬁshing vessel, year to year. Final esti-
mations indicate that increases in the volume of quota traded have resulted
in considerable eﬃciency gains and cost reductions in the SETF, ranging
from 1.8 to 3.5 cents per kilogram for surveyed vessels for every one per cent
increase in the volume of quota traded, or 1 to 2.4 per cent of total variable
costs, with considerable gains also accruing to crew and skipper in the form
of larger share payments. Mean vessel eﬃciency is relatively high in the
SETF, estimated at over 90 per cent, and increases further to 92 per cent
over the sample period with increased trades in quota.
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1. Introduction
Since the early 1990s there has been a trend in ﬁsheries management toward the
adoption of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Although not necessarily ap-
plicable to every ﬁshery, the rationale for the use of ITQs is clear. Tradeable
quotas to catch, based on a total allowable catch (TAC), in principle, both pro-
tect resource stocks and provide the incentives for a relatively more eﬃcient use of
ﬁshery resources. The volume of quota allocated (based on TAC) can be adjusted
season-to-season to suit the changing stock-recruitment characteristics of the ﬁsh-
ery, while the transferability of quota allows for a shift of ﬁshing entitlements and
ﬁshing eﬀort from relatively high to low marginal cost boats and provides vessels
an opportunity to obtain quota in cases where catch exceeds prior quota holdings.
There are at least two necessary conditions for ITQs to be eﬃciency enhanc-
ing in a ﬁshery. First, a well-organized market for the transfer of quota must
be established, at relatively low transactions costs.
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Second, quota holders must
participate in this market and in a manner that transfers quota from high to low
marginal cost producers and allows for an ex post transfer of quota among vessels
to compensate for catches that are larger or smaller than planned or prior quota
holdings. Kompas and Che (2001) found that the market for leased quota trades
in the South East Trawl Fishery (SETF) is active, indicating that transactions
and information costs are not suﬃcient to prevent substantial volumes of trade.
In the current paper eﬃciency gains and associated cost reductions from enhanced
trade in quota are estimated for the SETF, using Australian Fisheries Manage-
ment Authority (AFMA) and Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource
Economics (ABARE) survey data on 47 vessels in an unbalanced panel data set
(of 131 observations) for the period 1997 to 2000. It employs a technique which
speciﬁes a stochastic frontier cost function in order to decompose the variation
among vessels in the cost of harvesting ﬁsh due to unbounded random eﬀects
from those that result in diﬀerences in eﬃciency among ﬁshing vessels in the in-
dustry. Estimation of this frontier also provides key information on the relative
importance of input costs in the SETF, returns to scale, variations in costs as a
result of trade in quota and the economic performance of each ﬁshing vessel, year
1
On the problems with ‘thin’ markets, or markets with few participants and infrequent trans-
actions, thus leading to high transactions costs, see Squires, et al., 1995.
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to year.
Although stochastic frontier production functions have been the subject of
considerable econometric research during the past two decades, originating with
a general discussion of the nature of ineﬃciency in Farrell (1957), there are very
few examples (given their diﬃculty and the considerable data requirements) of
applied cost frontier analyses.
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Fortunately, for the SETF input costs can be
calculated from existing data sets and are seen, as required for the stochastic cost
frontier, to vary across vessel types and sizes.
Section 2 of the paper brieﬂy reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the
Australian South East Fishery, a lucrative ﬁshery in which the value of total
catch in 1999-2000 is estimated at $78 million (ABARE, 2001). The volume and
characteristics of trade in lease and permanent quota are also detailed. Section
4 provides the theoretical context for the stochastic cost frontier and associated
ineﬃciency model used in the estimations. Section 5 describes the data and
variables to be estimated.
There are three important points to note at the outset. First, like most ﬁsh-
eries, the SETF uses a combined wage and share payment system for crew and
skipper. In many cases the skipper is also the owner of the boat. Survey data
does not decompose total payments to labour (crew and skipper) by share and
standard wage payments and thus total labour payments reﬂect both costs and
what might naturally be considered as proﬁt payments, at least from the point
of view of returns to the ﬁshery as a whole. In this paper, estimates are thus
performed on both total labour payments as reported and on arbitrarily adjusted
labour payments to account for potential share amounts and the resulting eﬀects
on costs from trades in ITQs. The data and estimates clearly suggest that part of
the cost savings due to enhanced trade in quota accrue as added share payments
to crew and skipper. Second, there is no adequate data available for quota prices
in the SETF, leased or permanent, so expenditures on quota cannot be included
in estimates of the cost function. Any implied cost savings to individual vessels
(as opposed to the ﬁshery as a whole) from trades in quota must thus be evaluated
with this in mind. Finally, although quantitative assessments of (biomass) stocks
in the SETF are either very limited or do not exist, it is generally recognized that
many species are under considerable pressure, particularly orange roughy, eastern
gemﬁsh and blue warehou (AFFA, 2002). Since many large boats target these
species the eﬀects of trawl type and boat weight are estimated in the ineﬃciency
model in an attempt to account for these stock eﬀects. Potential decreases in
ﬁsh stocks will also be accounted for by increases in fuel expenditures and other
components in the frontier cost function. However, once trawl type and boat
weight are accounted for in the speciﬁcation (for large boats that target species
thought to be under pressure) there was little change in coeﬃcient values. Con-
2
Schmidt and Lovell (1979), Parikh, et al. (1995), Ray (1997) and Gropper, et al.(1999) and
are among the few and notable papers that estimate cost frontiers. Green (1993) and Forsund,
Lovell and Schmidt (1980) are useful surveys of both cost and production frontiers.
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tinued stock depletion (if any) thus appears to have had little or no eﬀect on the
estimates over the period 1997-2000.
Section 6 sets out the speciﬁcation of the stochastic cost frontier and inef-
ﬁciency model to be estimated and presents the results. Without speciﬁc cost
functions for each vessel and listed trades of quota from vessel to vessel it is
impossible to determine whether quota is sold from high to low marginal cost
producers directly. Instead, the eﬀects of traded quota on eﬃciency and costs are
estimated indirectly in the ineﬃciency model. Section 7 concludes. An appendix
collects technical details.
2. Previous Studies
Although many more general assessments exist (e.g., Kaufmann, et al., 1999), few
studies examine the economic eﬀects of transferable harvesting rights in ﬁsheries.
Of those available, ﬁsheries characterized by a single high valued species appear to
have yielded the largest eﬃciency gains from the adoption of ITQs. For example,
early analysis of Australia’s Southern Blueﬁn Tuna industry by Geen and Nayar
(1989) found substantial eﬃciency gains from the adoption of ITQ management.
Gauvin, Ward and Burgess (1994) examine conditions in the US wreckﬁsh ﬁshery
prior to and immediately after the introduction of ITQs. They suggest that
higher average and more stable prices, along with apparent reduction in capital
and eﬀort, following the move to ITQs is consistent with an increase in eﬃciency.
Similarly, Weninger (1998) ﬁnds signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains from the adoption of
ITQs in USA clam ﬁsheries. Grafton et al. (2000), for the British Columbia
halibut ﬁshery, shows that although substantial long term gains in eﬃciency can
be jeopardized by preexisting regulations, the gains form ITQs occur not just in
terms of cost eﬃciency but also include important beneﬁts in revenue and product
form.
Evidence for the performance of ITQs in multi-species ﬁsheries is more mixed.
Arnason (1993) ﬁnds strong evidence for gains in economic eﬃciency in the move
to ITQs in Iceland’s ﬁsheries, some of which are multi-species trawl ﬁsheries.
Campbell and Lindner (1990) estimate signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains across a variety
of New Zealand ﬁsheries, including multi-species cases. Dupont and Grafton
(2001) found that ITQs in the multi species Scotia-Fundy mobile gear ground-
ﬁshery have encouraged vessels to better allocate their catches over the ﬁshing
season and increased the quality and price of their product. On the other hand,
Squires and Kirkley (1996), ﬁnd that the potential economic gains from applying
ITQs in a USA mixed trawl ﬁshery could be small. A primary reason for that
ﬁnding is existing excess capacity in a ﬁshery. Lipton and Strand (1992) also ﬁnd
excess capacity at the time of adoption of ITQs as limiting eﬃciency gains.
With the exception of Weninger (1998) and Grafton et al. (2000), none of the
above papers test for eﬃciency gains from ITQs in a stochastic frontier setting
and neither Weninger (1998) or Grafton et al. (2000) provide a direct test of a
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stochastic cost frontier. However, Grafton et al. (2000) do obtain dual cost fron-
tier eﬃciency measures from estimates of a Cobb-Douglas stochastic production
frontier and nicely decompose allocative and technical eﬃciency measures on this
basis.
3. The Australian South East Fishery
The South East Fishery (SEF) is a complex, multi-species, trawl and non-trawl
ﬁshery situated oﬀ the south east coast of Australia. The ﬁshery, targeting about
118 species of ﬁnﬁsh and deep-water crustaceans, provides the major (scale) fresh
ﬁsh requirements to south east Australia. The value of catch in 1999-2000 is
estimated at $78 million, accounting for 19 per cent of the total catch in Com-
monwealth ﬁsheries (ABARE, 2001).
The trawl sector of the SEF in Australia is a multi-species ﬁshery extending
south from Barrenjoey Point in NSW, around Victoria and Tasmania, to Cape
Willoughby in South Australia. The ﬁshery includes over 100 species of ﬁnﬁsh
and deep-water crustaceans. The majority of catches are taken using three types
of trawl method: otter board, Danish seine and mid-water trawl.
3
The major
species landed are orange roughy, blue grenadier, ling and tiger ﬂathead. The
value of the trawl sector catch in 1999-2000 alone is estimated to be $72 million
(ABARE, 2001).
Prior to 1992, the SEF was managed by a series of input controls, with the
exception of an ITQ system for eastern gemﬁsh. Individual transferable quotas
were further extended in 1992 (covering an additional ﬁfteen species) as a result of
concerns about stock sustainability, falling proﬁtability and the apparent failure
of input controls to reduce eﬀort and ﬁshing capacity in the ﬁshery. Each ﬁshing
year AFMA allocates seasonal quotas based on each operator’s permanent quota
holdings together with any adjustment for under- or over-catch from the previous
season. Operators have the option of changing their quota mix by leasing allotted
3
Danish seiners are small low-powered vessels which typically target ﬂathead and whiting in
relatively shallow shelf waters. The Danish seine ﬂeet mainly operates out of Lakes Entrance in
Victoria and nearly all ﬁshing activity takes place in Bass Strait and Eastern Zone B. In 1995,
Danish seiners accounted for 75 and 29 per cent of the total landings of school whiting and tiger
ﬂathead, respectively, in the trawl sector (Sachse and O’Brien, 1996). Danish seiners also catch
small quantities of a number of other quota species including, most importantly, john dory and
jackass morwong (Hogan, et al., 1999).
Inshore otter trawlers are smaller trawlers which generally operate in the shallow continental
shelf and upper shelf waters to a depth of 500 metres and catch a variety of species. Inshore
trawlers operate out of Ulladulla and Eden in New South Wales and Portland in Victoria. Most
ﬁshing activity occurs in the Eastern A, Eastern B and Western management zones, although a
small quantity of ﬁsh is taken in the Bass Strait (Hogan, et al., 1999).
Oﬀshore otter trawlers are larger vessels which mainly operate in the deeper continental slope
waters of the western and eastern Tasmania management zones. These vessels usually work in
depths between 600m to 1000m targeting orange roughy and winter spawning aggregations of
blue grenadier (Geen, et al., 1993).
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quota from other operators at any time during the ﬁshing year. Quota transac-
tions occur through a broker or directly between operators. All transfers of quota
are recorded by AFMA, although it is not a requirement to report the price at
which quota is traded. In the Danish seine sector, a holding company pools the
seasonal allocations of individual operators at the beginning of the season and
allocates quota back to operators as catches are made. Permanent quota trading
was restricted from March 1992 to January 1994 such that only full quota buy-
outs were permitted. Overall, the volume of permanent quota transfers increased
from 1,346 tonnes in 1992 to a peak of 6,119 tonnes in 1994 and has since declined
to 1,615 tonnes in 1999 (table 1). Most quota trade in the SEF continues to be
through lease transactions (ﬁgure 1). Including orange roughy, where the allow-
able quota has been substantially reduced since 1993 (TAC for most other species
in the SETF is not binding), the annual volume of lease trade has nonetheless
increased considerably from 18,400 tonnes in 1992 to 27,172 tonnes in 2000 (table
2). Most of the increase in lease trades has occurred since 1996 (ﬁgure 1). On
average, 21,100 tonnes of quota have been leased out each year between 1992 and
2000.
4. Theoretical Context
Since our concern is with a panel data set, index vessels by i and time periods by
t. Following Schmidt and Lovell (1979), deﬁne a stochastic production frontier as
Q
it
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
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jit
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

e
(v
it
−u
it
)
(4.1)
where Q
it
is output of boat i at year t, x
jit
is the amount of input j used by
boat i at year t, n is number of inputs used, α
j
is the share parameter of input
j in the ﬁshing production function, A is total factor productivity and (v
it
− u
it
)
a composite error term, for v a random stochastic variable and u a measure of
ineﬃciency. The dual stochastic cost frontier (see appendix A) is given by
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or in log form
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6
for
α
0
= ln r −
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lnα
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−
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lnA (4.4)
where p
j
is the factor price of input j and
r =
n
∑
j=1
α
j
(4.5)
is a measure of returns to scale. Throughout, the term v represents a random
stochastic variable, with the usual properties, or v ∼ N(0, σ
2
v
), accounting for
eﬀects on output and costs beyond vessel control. The term u is a non-negative
ineﬃciency eﬀect, assumed to be drawn from a normal distribution truncated at
zero. In the case where u
it
= 0 across all vessels and time periods, equations (4.1)
and (4.2) revert to the standard production and cost function implying that all
vessels are fully eﬃcient. For any u
it
> 0 output is lower and costs are larger and
thus harvest is ineﬃcient. The value u
it
can be further restricted by
u
it
= u(z
it
; δ) (4.6)
where z accounts for the eﬀects of ﬁshery and vessel-speciﬁc terms that inﬂuence
eﬃciency and δ are parameters to be estimated. Equation (4.6) can also include
a random stochastic variable. The measure of eﬃciency E
it
is given by
E
it
= e
−u
it
(4.7)
and is clearly bounded between zero and one.
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Although total input payments for each factor of production are listed in the
data set, exact input price data is not available for the SETF. The cost function
thus has to be expressed in terms of total payments (ε
jit
) to each input. However,
when constant returns to scale holds, or r = 1, equation (4.2) is equivalent (see
appendix B) to
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it
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or, in log form
lnC
it
=

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+lnQ
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+
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ln
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ε
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− (v
it
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) (4.9)
4
The complications of a systems estimate with ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal input use
by factor of production are avoided in this paper, as is a decomposition between technical and
allocative eﬃciency (see Schmidt and Lovell, 1979 and Coelli, Rao and Battese, 1998) and scale
economies, including short run measures of eﬃciency (see Grafton, et al., 2000). It is worth
noting that there is a dimension of allocative eﬃciency, that is, the choice of the total amount of
eﬀort applied to the ﬁshery, that cannot be captured directly by the analysis of individual boat
data.
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for

α
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and noting that
α˜
0
= α
0
− lnA. (4.11)
With CRS, or when r = 1, estimates of equations (4.3) and (4.9) are thus equiv-
alent, except for the change in the constant. In particular, the coeﬃcients α
j
are
the same. Parameter estimates for equation (4.9) are obtained through maximum
likelihood estimates (MLE), where the maximum likelihood function is based on a
joint density function for the error term −(v
it
−u
it
) (Stevenson, 1980). Eﬃciency
can be calculated for each individual ﬁrm or vessel per year by
E[exp(u
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) | −(v
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for σ
a
=
√
γ(1− γ)σ
2
, σ
2
≡ σ
2
u
+ σ
2
v
, γ ≡ σ
2
u
/σ
2
and Φ(·) the density function
of a standard normal random variable (Battese and Coelli, 1988). The value of
γ = 0 when there are no deviations in costs due to ineﬃciency and γ = 1 implies
that no deviations in costs result from stochastic random eﬀects with variance
σ
2
v
.
5. Data and Variables
The unbalanced panel data set used in this paper consists of forty-seven vessels
over the period 1997 to 2000, or 131 observations with ﬁfty-seven missing ob-
servations (table 3). The original database was drawn from annual surveys and
statistics for the SETF ﬂeet carried out and compiled by ABARE and AFMA.
The raw database includes measures of output (value and quantity of total ﬁsh
landed), type of ﬁshing (otter trawl and Danish seine), length of vessels, under-
deck tonnage, engine power, ﬁshing hours, boat composition (wood, steel etc.),
boat value, boat depreciation, average number of crew onboard, labour costs,
fuel costs, gear costs, material costs (including costs for oil, grease, boat and gear
repair, bait, ice, and packing materials). Fishing logbook data obtained from
AFMA includes data for all vessels for the period 1997-2000, including the num-
ber of ﬁshing hours (eﬀort) and other vessel characteristics. Of the roughly 103
vessels operating in the SETF during the sample period, the forty-seven vessels
in the unbalanced panel data set represent more than 50 per cent of the total
catch of ﬁsh in the area each year.
A summary list of all speciﬁc variables is contained in table 4 and associated
summary statistics are given in table 5. All values are indexed by base year 1997.
Output variables are available for both quantity and value. Total ﬁsh volume sold
for all species was provided from ABARE surveys. The value of ﬁsh landed or
total income from ﬁsh sold was derived as the diﬀerence between the total value
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of ﬁsh sold and the expenditures for ﬁsh marketing and transportation. Based on
raw cost variables, cost expenditure components were derived including those for
four major groups: capital, labour, fuel, gear and materials. The value of boat
capital is the market value of boat, hull, engine and onboard equipment (exclud-
ing quota and endorsement values) as of July during the survey year. Capital
costs are deﬁned by the user cost of capital calculated as a sum of depreciation
cost, the annual opportunity cost of the total capital value and the diﬀerence
in boat value between season opening and closing time in a given year. Vessel
depreciation is based on the discrete diminishing value method used in ABARE
surveys.
5
The opportunity cost for vessel capital was derived as the multiple
of the nominal interest rate and vessel capital value. Fuel cost was calculated
as total fuel expenditures used for ﬁshing for the ﬁnancial year. Gear cost was
calculated as total expenditures for gear (purchasing, maintaining and repairing)
used for ﬁshing each year. Material costs are calculated as a sum of the costs for
boat repairs (the most important part of material costs), bait and ice, packing
materials and other material costs. The factor price for capital, labour and fuel
is derived as the cost required to produce a dollar value of output. Since gear and
material costs generally depend on ﬁsh volume trawled (regardless of the value of
ﬁsh) this measure is derived as the cost required for trawling a kilogram of ﬁsh.
Expenditures for labour (crew and skipper) are obtained from ABARE surveys
and generally include both wage and share payments.
6. Empirical Results
Prior to testing the cost frontier, a production function for the SETF is estimated
to test for returns to scale. In log form the speciﬁcation of equation (4.1) is
lnQ
it
= γ
0
+ γ
1
K
it
+ γ
2
LAB
it
+ γ
3
F
it
+ γ
4
M
it
+ γ
5
G
it
+ v
it
− u
it
(6.1)
for Q the value of output, K capital, or boat value, LAB labour, or the average
number of crew on board, F fuel, M material and G gear expenditures.. All
dollar values are measured in 1997 prices. Estimated coeﬃcients are reported in
table 6.
6
Table 7 reports log likelihood ratio tests
7
for equation (6.1), indicating
that the null hypothesis of a Cobb Douglas form of the production function and
constant returns to scale (CRS) cannot be rejected.
5
The diminishing value method is based on current replacement cost, or V , and the age of
each capital item. The depreciation value (D) in the initial period is given by D
0
= δV
0
and thus
at year t, D
t
= δ(V
t−1
−D
t−1
) for V
t−1
the boat value in the previous year. The depreciation
rate (δ) is the standard rate allowed by the Australian Tax Oﬃce.
6
Results for the stochastic production frontier are reported for simplicity in ‘error correction
form’, or without a speciﬁcation of an ineﬃciency model, since the test for constant returns to
scale is the primary concern. Including an ineﬃciency model (results available from the authors
on request) results in only a slight change in coeﬃcients. In all cases the null hypothesis of CRS
cannot be rejected.
7
The relevant test statistic is given by equation (6.4).
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With CRS, estimates of each α
j
in equations (4.3) and (4.9) are equivalent.
For the SETF equation (4.9) is thus speciﬁed as
lnC
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Q
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) (6.2)
for C costs, Q output (or harvest) and input expenses (ε
jit
) for capital, labour
(total labour costs including skipper), fuel, materials and gear per unit of output,
indexed for vessel i and time period t.
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The cost ineﬃciency model, or equation
(4.6 ), is given by
u
it
= δ
0
+ δ
1
ln qt+ δ
2
trawl + δ
3
lnweight+ ω
it
(6.3)
for qt the volume of (net) lease quota traded, trawl the type of trawl method used
(a binary variable with zero for Danish seine and one for inshore and oﬀshore
otter trawlers), weight vessel weight and ω
it
a random stochastic variable for
ω
it
∼ N(0, σ
2
ω
).
9
Since this is a ‘share payment’ ﬁshery various values for payments
to labour are trialed, ranging from reported ABARE data (which includes all
payments to labour and skipper, composed of standard wages and share payments
for labour per unit of output sold on each vessel, or model 1) to cases where total
labour costs, including skipper costs, are arbitrarily divided by 2 (model 2), 2.5,
and 3 to account for a potential diﬀerence between wage and share payments. A
precise decomposition is not reported in the data set.
10
The speciﬁcation given by equations (6.2) and (6.3) was determined on the
basis of generalized likelihood ratio tests, with the relevant test statistic given by
LR = −2{ln[L(H
0
)]− ln[L(H
1
)]} (6.4)
where L(H
0
) and L(H
1
) are the values of the likelihood function under the null
and alternative hypotheses. Likelihood ratio tests are reported in table 7 with
critical values for the test statistic drawn from a mixed χ-squared distribution
8
Unfortunately there are no useful data for quota prices available for use as an independent
variable in equation (6.2). Although quota prices are evidently available for 1998 (see Bose, et
al., 2000) it is not possible to match this data to boats and quota trades in the data set for the
period 1997-2000. The AFMA data set provides detailed quota trades by species but not by
price. ABARE survey data has limited records on quota prices for the years 1999 and 2000, but
these are inadequate for purposes of estimation. Additional supplementary survey data in this
regard is planned for the future.
9
Including permanent quota trades in the measure of qt does not alter the results. In any
case, lease trades are the preferred measure since these are more directly tied to potential cost
reductions, particularly for vessels that target a given species.
10
Total wage payments (wage and share payments) in the data set vary from $27 to $394
per person per boat-day, with an average of $143. An alternative to the arbitrary division of
wage costs into wages and share payments is the attempt to measure the opportunity cost of
labour by market or award rates for comparable occupations. Supplementary survey questions
are planned in the future in an attempt to determine the opportunity cost of crew and skipper
in the SETF.
10
as reported in Kodde and Palm (1986). The null hypotheses of a time trend in
the cost frontier and technical ineﬃciency models is rejected. The null hypothesis
that technical ineﬃciency eﬀects are absent (γ = δ
0
= δ
1
= δ
2
= δ
3
= 0) and that
vessel-speciﬁc eﬀects do not inﬂuence technical ineﬃciencies (δ
1
= δ
2
= δ
3
= 0)
in equation (6.3) are both rejected as is δ
0
= δ
1
= δ
2
= δ
3
= 0. Finally, the
null hypothesis that γ = σ
2
u
/(σ
2
v
+ σ
2
u
) = 0, or that ineﬃciency eﬀects are not
stochastic, is also rejected. All results indicate the stochastic and ineﬃciency
eﬀects matter so that usual OLS estimates are not appropriate in this study.
The maximum likelihood estimates for the stochastic cost function (equation
6.2) and the ineﬃciency model (equation 6.3) are reported in table 8 for the
case of wages that include all share payments (model 1) and the case in which
half of the wage rate is assumed to be a share payment and thus excluded from
costs (model 2). In both cases the largest component of costs in the stochastic
cost frontier is the price of labour although (not surprisingly) its value falls from
0.51 to 0.33 in model 2. The price of materials and fuel are the next largest
components. The low coeﬃcient value on capital is a likely consequence of using
a ‘book value’ measure of capital in the data set. All estimates are signiﬁcant at
the 1 per cent level, with standard errors in parentheses.
11
Of particular interest in the ineﬃciency model is the estimated coeﬃcient on
the volume of quota traded. In both models, the sign on this coeﬃcient is negative
indicating that an increase in the volume of quota traded (in tonnes of ﬁsh) results
in enhanced eﬃciency and a consequent decrease in costs. Again, not surprisingly,
this value rises from -1.05 to -1.70 in model 2 since adjusted wage rates are now
half of their previous value. Positive values for coeﬃcients on trawl and boat
weight indicate that inshore and oﬀshore otter trawlers (larger boats) are less
cost eﬃcient. The reason for this is clear in the SETF. Oﬀshore otter trawlers,
which are typically made of steel, ﬁsh more than 50 kms oﬀshore, principally
targeting orange roughy, eastern gemﬁsh and blue warehou.
12
However, stocks of
these ﬁsh are thought to have declined considerably over the past twenty years
(AFFA, 2002) indicating longer ﬁshing trips and higher costs for oﬀshore vessels.
13
11
The results for the estimates of the cost frontier were conﬁrmed using a ‘random coeﬃcients
approach’, following Kalirajan and Obwona (1994), allowing for the possibility of non-neutral
shifts in the frontiers.
12
More recently, these otter trawlers have moved to the inshore sector.
13
As mentioned there is no adequate stock assessment data available for the quota species in
the SETF. An attempt to account for stock declines in the overall regression with year dummies
and a split sample shows that with trawl type and boat size included (for large boats that target
species thought to be under pressure), as given in equation (6.3), there was little change in
coeﬃcient values. For example, adding a year dummy in the cost frontier for 1997 generates
a coeﬃcient of -0.001 with low signiﬁcance. Testing for years separately also resulted in little
change in the coeﬃcient on quota traded, although the share coeﬃcient on fuel expenditures
increased slightly in the last year of the sample. The eﬀect of including trawl type and boat size
in the ineﬃciency model thus appears to adequately account for any suspected stock declines
over the sample period. Leaving orange roughy, eastern gemﬁsh and blue warehou aside, the ﬁnal
results suggest little eﬀects from stock decline from 1997-2000 in the overall (when accounting
11
Danish seine vessels are typically smaller vessels made of wood and target closer
to shore on species that are relatively more abundant.
The value of γ = σ
2
u
/(σ
2
v
+σ
2
u
) is high in both models indicating that diﬀerences
in eﬃciency dominate stochastic random eﬀects, a likely characteristic of an ITQ
ﬁshery where ﬁshing days can be reserved for favorable weather conditions and
the speciﬁc targeting of each species depending on quota holdings. Mean technical
eﬃciency is also roughly the same in both models but rises from 90.42 (89.29) in
model 1 (model 2) in 1997 to 92.12 in both models in the year 2000, reﬂecting
the eﬃciency gains from increased trades in quota.
Sensitivity results for diﬀerent values of labour costs are reported in table
9 and conﬁrm expectations. The lower are labour costs (and hence the higher
are potential share payments) the lower is the estimated coeﬃcient on the price
of labour and the larger is the coeﬃcient on the volume of quota traded. Re-
moving potential share payments from labour costs thus increases the measure
of eﬃciency or the cost savings from having trades in quota. Model 3 is the case
where labour costs are divided by 2.5 and in model 4 by 3. The coeﬃcient on the
volume of quota traded ranges from -1.05 to -2.02. The impact on cost savings for
the surveyed ﬁshery from trade in ITQs is substantial. Table 10 indicates total
ﬁshing costs and cost savings per kilogram of ﬁsh landed that result from a one
percent increase in the total volume of quota traded, for the years 1997 to 2000.
Depending on the amount of total payments to labour, cost savings range from
1.8 to 3.5 cents per kilogram. Even in the case where total payments to labour
are not adjusted for potential share payments (model 1), cost savings range from
1.8 to 2.1 cents per kilogram, or 1 to 2.4 per cent of total variable costs, with total
cost savings (based on actual catch) to the surveyed ﬁshery in 1999, for example,
of $110,000. In all four models, cost savings fall slightly from 1998 to 2000. The
reason for this is unclear, although it is possible that either eﬃciency gains are
dissipating over time as the volume of quota trade increases.
7. Concluding Remarks
Few studies exist on the direct beneﬁts of ITQs in ﬁsheries. Using a stochastic cost
frontier and associated ineﬃciency model, this paper estimates the eﬃciency gains
and cost reductions associated with enhanced trades in ITQs in the Australian
south east trawl ﬁshery. It is impossible to determine whether or not trades
literally occur from high to low marginal cost producers. Instead, this paper
accounts for eﬃciency gains and cost reductions by estimating a cost frontier and
ineﬃciency model for 47 vessels directly, in an unbalanced data set over the years
1997 to 2000. Cost reductions thus occur not only as a result of transfers from
high to low marginal costs producers, but also to vessels that obtain catch in
for all sixteen quota species) regression. Including the dummy variable for trawl type in the cost
frontier instead of the ineﬃcient model also leaves the ﬁnal results in table 8 unchanged. All
results are available from the authors upon request.
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excess of prior quota holdings through lease trades.
Estimated eﬃciency gains and cost reductions are considerable. Even in the
case where all share payments to labour are considered as costs items, ITQs result
in a cost savings of 1.8 to 2.1 cents per kilogram for every one percent increase
in the volume of quota traded. In the year 1999, for example, total cost savings
in the surveyed ﬁshery amount to approximately $110,000, with cost reductions
ranging (depending on the size of labours share) ranging from 1 to 2.4 per cent
of total variable costs. Considerable gains also undoubtedly accrue to crew and
skipper in the form of larger share payments. Mean vessel eﬃciency levels are
relatively high in the SETF, estimated at over 90 per cent, increasing further to
92 per cent over the sample period with increased trades in quota.
As future survey data on quota prices becomes available, further research in-
tends to examine the ‘wedge’ between the price of lease quota and the market
price of ﬁsh to determine the exact extent to which quota trades decrease trans-
actions costs in the SETF. A knowledge of quota prices (as a weighted average
across species or as independent variables in the cost frontier) would also allow
for a more direct test of any potential stock depletion, since a decline in stocks
would partially be reﬂected in higher quota prices.
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Appendix A: Formation of the stochastic cost frontier
Following Schmidt and Lovell (1979), the minimum value cost (C
it
) function
of boat i at year t is
C
it
=min
x
jit
n
∑
j=1
p
j
x
jit
(A1)
where p
j
is the factor price of input j, x
jit
is the amount of input j used by boat
i at year t, and n is number of inputs used. The problem is to minimize equation
(A1) subject to a production technology given by
Q
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
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e
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where Q
it
is output of boat i at year t, α
j
is the share parameter of input j
in the ﬁshing production function, A is total factor productivity and (v
it
− u
it
)
a composite error term, for v a random stochastic variable and u a measure of
ineﬃciency. First order conditions are
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for all j, or
p
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= λα
j
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(A4)
ignoring the composite error.
Dividing equation (A4) by p
1
and solving for x
jit
as a function of x
1it
gives
x
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and using equation (A2) obtains
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Denoting returns to scale as r =
n
∑
j=1
α
j
implies that
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and solving x
1it
as a function of Q
it
and using equation (A5) gives
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for all j.
Finally, substituting equation (A8) into (A1) obtains the stochastic cost fron-
tier
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or equation (4.2). In log form, this gives
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as in equations (4.3) and (4.4).
Appendix B: CRS and the stochastic cost frontier with total input
payments
With CRS equation (A9) becomes simply
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Let total expenses to each input j be given by
ε
jit
= p
j
x
jit
(B2)
for boat i at year t. Solving for input prices p
j
and substituting into equation
(B1) lets the cost function be expressed as
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Given a production function
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equation (B3) becomes
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In log form, this gives
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Table 1: Permanent quota transfers (tonnes) 
 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Blue eye trevalla  3.3 12.3 27.8 5.8 3.5 0.4 7.1 0.6 9.4 
Blue grenadier 181.1 465.0 1459.4 266.5 172.5 13.3 1,893.5 915.9 683.5 
Blue warehou (a)  0.0 144.9 234.1 189.1 4.5 46.3 45.0 10.9 66.9 
Flathead 161.6 280.1 503.1 291.7 224.5 38.5 221.7 174.3 277.2 
Gemfish eastern 13.9 17.3 34.9 7.0 0.9 9.3 19.0 1.7 7.1 
Gemfish western 1.0 47.1 5.1 20.3 1.4 50.0 2.3 0.0 58.6 
Jackass morwong 141.5 171.9 349.0 120.9 46.9 29.5 113.4 47.8 74.4 
John dory 9.2 30.7 55.1 7.2 0.9 36.1 26.7 1.3 9.3 
Ling 47.8 58.9 192.6 51.9 49.4 90.9 46.1 34.6 70.2 
Mirro dory 22.6 87.1 107.1 45.5 14.6 24.3 84.2 24.4 35.5 
Ocean perch 15.7 10.7 102.3 35.2 2.1 34.4 30.2 3.8 17.4 
Orange roughy east 116.8 135.7 352.8 178.5 78.1 0.0 134.5 163.7 251.0 
Orange roughy south 3,04.0 904.1 1,069.0 100.3 47.8 0.8 57.9 0.0 67.2 
Orange roughy west  79.0 137.0 310.6 28.7 37.5 0.0 16.2 2.7 104.6 
Redfish  39.5 77.9 178.4 99.0 17.4 5.2 75.0 1.1 45.8 
Royal red prawn  9.7 38.4 13.3 6.3 1.0 9.7 43.9 19.5 0.2 
School whiting  13.4 160.1 515.8 210.2 91.7 62.9 56.3 163.3 214.2 
Silver trevally  24.6 48.9 131.7 27.8 0.8 10.2 39.3 0.0 30.2 
Spotted warehou  161.4 291.1 477.2 230.9 73.2 165.7 44.8 49.2 214.2 
Total 1,346        3,119        6,119        1,923           869           628        2,957        1,615 2,443.6 
Source: AFMA quota monitoring system; (a) blue and spotted warehou treated as a single species in 
1992.  
 
Table 2: Leased quota transfers (tonnes) 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Blue eye trevalla  64.5 87.5 81.2 85.1 96.4 115.9 108.7 107.2 119.9 
Blue grenadier 2,352.0 3,004.7 2,214.3 1,534.2 2,395.6 4,829.4 11,584.4 14,350.6 8,792.7 
Blue warehou (a)  - 564.3 577.3 583.5 752.8 702.0 689.9 322.8 499.1 
Flathead 514.7 1,810.6 1,988.4 2,226.2 1,926.4 2,203.9 4,020.8 4,691.1 4,634.3 
Gemfish eastern 85.3 30.9 23.0 18.6 12.0 85.1 180.7 132.2 92.1 
Gemfish western 104.5 144.3 47.3 61.0 114.7 85.9 99.1 185.0 317.8 
Jackass morwong 479.4 641.8 508.3 478.1 577.9 902.3 843.2 780.4 752.9 
John dory 53.7 60.9 75.5 69.6 69.1 51.6 105.3 88.6 112.2 
Ling 261.8 467.5 537.2 780.6 901.1 780.5 1370.4 1446.3 1661.1 
Mirro dory 155.5 205.0 171.4 201.4 290.3 363.6 376.8 260.0 292.5 
Ocean perch 64.9 107.7 185.5 131.8 162.4 199.4 281.7 191.7 267.2 
Orange roughy east 5,379.3 1,312.6 1,152.9 1,512.7 1,410.3 1,532.8 1,918.7 2,134.0 1,999.2 
Orange roughy south 5,432.1 7,163.1 4,638.2 2,024.8 1,084.9 1,823.9 505.1 421.0 609.3 
Orange roughy west  1,568.4 1,047.7 730.5 984.8 1464.2 551.5 920.0 675.1 826.0 
Redfish  220.6 255.4 378.9 619.2 534.2 926.6 1529.5 864.0 530.9 
Royal red prawn  50.5 59.3 107.0 136.6 112.3 78.7 152.3 247.2 277.9 
School whiting  708.0 1,387.1 1,246.0 1,698.9 1,216.5 1,285.7 1,606.1 1,308.1 1,441.3 
Silver trevally  56.8 92.0 169.0 212.1 160.9 160.0 204.1 143.0 175.3 
Spotted warehou  848.9 1,360.2 1,309.8 1,397.1 1,602.6 1,434.0 2,311.3 2,993.4 3,770.2 
Total 18,400 19,803 16,142 14,756 14,885 18,113 28,808 31,345 27,172 
Source: AFMA quota monitoring system, 1997-2002; (a) blue and spotted warehou treated as a single 
species in 1992.  
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Figure 1: Permanent quota and leased quota transferred, 1992-2000 (tonnes) 
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Table 3: Unbalanced panel data used for estimations (SETF) 
 
Boat No 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total observation 
1 * * * * 4 
2 * * * * 4 
3 * * * * 4 
4 * * na na 2 
5 * * * * 4 
6 * * * * 4 
7 na na * * 2 
8 * * na na 2 
9 * * * * 4 
10 na * * * 3 
11 * * * * 4 
12 * * na na 2 
13 na * * * 3 
14 * * na na 2 
15 * * na na 2 
16 * * na na 2 
17 * * na na 2 
18 * * na na 2 
19 na na * * 2 
20 na na * * 2 
21 na na * * 2 
22 * * * * 4 
23 * * na na 2 
24 * * na na 2 
25 * * * * 4 
26 * * * * 4 
27 * * * * 4 
28 * * na na 2 
29 * * * * 4 
30 * * * * 4 
31 na na * * 2 
32 * * * * 4 
33 * * na na 2 
34 * * na na 2 
35 * * * * 4 
36 * * * * 4 
37 * * na na 2 
38 * * na na 2 
39 * * na na 2 
40 * * na na 2 
41 * * na na 2 
42 na * * * 3 
43 na na * * 2 
44 na na * * 2 
45 na na * * 2 
46 * * * * 4 
47 na na * * 2 
      
Total 35 38 29 29 131 
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Table 4: Description of outputs, inputs and vessel specific variables 
(47 vessels for the period 1997-2000) 
 
Variables Description Sources  
   
Q Total fish sold (kg)  ABARE 
Y Gross value from fish sold ($) ABARE 
TYPE Type of fishing operation: AFMA Log Book  
      Trawl =1;  Danish = 0    
TIME Year of observation   
      1997=1; 1998=2; 1999=3; 2000=4  
SIZE Vessel length (meters) AFMA Log Book 
WEIGHT Under deck tonnage AFMA Log Book 
POWER Registered engine power (kw) AFMA Log Book 
EFF Fishing hours (hours) AFMA Log Book 
HULL Boat material, e.g., wood, steel, aluminum  AFMA Log Book 
K Boat value ($) ABARE  
DK Boat depreciation ($) ABARE  
LAB Average number of crew on boat (no) ABARE 
LCOST Labor costs ($) ABARE 
FCOST Fuel costs ($) ABARE 
GCOST Gear costs ($) ABARE 
MCOST Other costs including costs for oil grease, repairs for 
boat, ,cost 
ABARE 
 ge r bait, packing materials, ice and other materials  
   
   
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Summary statistics for key variables in the SEFT Fishery  
(Unbalanced panel data: 131 observations for 47 vessels, 1997-2000) 
 
 
 Average Stdev Min Max
Total fish landed  kg        208,881        174,567              5,000        1,171,634  
Total value of fish sold  $       453,067        537,058            25,000        4,984,615  
Size meters              19.4               5.0               12.8                45.7  
Weight  tones              73.4             58.2               13.0              371.0  
Power kw            243.0           136.3               82.0              888.0  
Effort hours           1,050              526                  43              2,819  
Boat capital value  $       182,505        153,445            21,153          784,468  
Capital cost $         28,055         22,974              3,326          108,875  
Labor persons              3.3               1.1                 2.0                 9.0  
Labor costs $       168,716        164,097            16,140        1,528,848  
Fuel cost $         79,560        103,218              5,284          791,048  
Gear cost $         28,304         38,521                500          220,000  
Material costs and services $       187,589        225,334            13,580        1,597,816  
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Table 6: Parameter estimates of the production function (equation 6.1) 
 
 Coefficient 
 
Asymptotic  
T-ratio 
 
Constant  1.69*** 
(0.48) 
3.48 
Capital  0.02 
(0.03) 
0.34 
Labor  0.65*** 
(0.05) 
12.32 
Fuel  0.16*** 
(0.03) 
4.49 
Material  0.12*** 
(0.03) 
3.26 
Gear  0.04** 
(0.02) 
1.73 
   
Sigma-squared 0.11*** 
(.029) 
4.16 
Gamma 0.785*** 
(.064) 
12.22 
Ln (likelihood) 20.20  
Notes:  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10 level, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.  
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.  
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Table 7: Generalised likelihood ratio tests  
     
Null hypothesis Model 1 Model 2 χ20.99-value Decision 
 χ2-statistic χ2-statistic   
     
Production function is Cobb Douglas (equation 6.1) 
 
 β6 = β7 =…..= β15 = 0 3.68 N/A 24.049 cannot reject H0 
 
    
Production function exhibits constant returns to scale  (equation 6.1) 
 
 β1 + β2 +…..+ β5 = 1 0.22 N/A 16.07 cannot reject H0 
 
    
Parameters tests of the stochastic cost frontier and technical inefficiency models (equations 6.2 and 6.3) 
γ =δ0=δ1 =δ2 =δ3 = 0 81.34 101.46 16.074 reject H0 
δ1 =δ2 =δ3 = 0 18.8 66.62 12.483 reject H0 
δ0=δ1 =δ2 =δ3  = 0 57.82 103.86 14.325 reject H0 
γ  = 0  71.10 111.72 8.273 reject H0 
     
No time trend in the stochastic cost frontier (equation 6.2) 
βTIME = 0 0.40 0.80 8.27 cannot reject H0 
No time trend in the efficiency model (equation 6.3)
 
βTIME = 0 0.10 0.20 8.27 cannot reject H0 
    
 
Notes: (i) The critical values for the hypotheses are obtained from Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986); 
(ii) the coefficients β6, β7 , …,β15  are parameters indicating pairs of translog relationships among capital, 
labour, fuel, material and gear; and (iii) the coefficients β1,β2 ,…, β5 are the estimated share parameters 
of capital, labour, fuel, material and gear respectively. 
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Table 8: Parameter estimates of the stochastic cost frontier and technical 
inefficiency models, (equations 6.2 and 6.3) 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Coefficient 
 
Asymptotic  
T-ratio 
Coefficient 
 
Asymptotic  
T-ratio 
Stochastic cost frontier     
Constant  1.18*** 
(0.059) 
19.86 1.30*** 
(0.08) 
15.25 
Output 1.00*** 
(0.005) 
209.35 1.00*** 
(0.075) 
132.35 
Capital price  0.08*** 
(0.008) 
9.29 0.11*** 
(0.086) 
12.33 
Labor price  0.51*** 
(0.02) 
27.97 0.33*** 
(0.020) 
16.36 
Fuel price  0.12*** 
(0.007) 
16.66 0.17*** 
(0.010) 
16.60 
Material price  0.20*** 
(0.012) 
16.15 0.27*** 
(0.013) 
20.55 
Gear price  0.04*** 
(0.004) 
9.44 0.05*** 
(0.005) 
8.92 
     
     
Inefficiency model      
Constant 7.34** 
(3.34) 
2.19 14.10** 
(5.599) 
2.52 
Quota traded  -1.05** 
(0.45) 
2.30 -1.70*** 
(0.66) 
2.56 
Type of trawl  0.70** 
(0.36) 
1.94 0.69** 
(0.273) 
2.51 
Boat weight 0.47*** 
(0.16) 
2.87 0.45*** 
(0.153) 
2.95 
     
Sigma-squared 0.10*** 
(0.04) 
2.49 0.117*** 
(0.042) 
2.78 
Gamma 0.997*** 
(0.001) 
673.80 0.995*** 
(0.003) 
3.77 
Ln (likelihood) 187.44  172.27  
Mean Technical Efficiency  
 
91.91%  91.65%  
Notes:  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10 level, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.  
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.  
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Table 9: Estimated results for sensitivity analysis on labour costs 
 
   
 Parameter for the price of 
labour the 
stochastic cost frontier model 
Parameter for the volume of lease 
quota traded in the inefficiency 
model 
   
     
 Coefficient 
 
Asymptotic 
T-ratio 
Coefficient 
 
Asymptotic 
T-ratio 
     
Model 1 
Total payments to labour/value 
of output  
0.51*** 
(0.02) 
27.97 -1.05** 
(0.45) 
2.30 
Model 2 
Total payments to labour/2/value 
of output 
0.33*** 
(0.020) 
16.36 -1.70*** 
(0.66) 
2.56 
Model 3  
Total payments to labour/2.5 
/value of output 
0.28*** 
(0.02) 
13.20 -2.12** 
(1.29) 
1.64 
Model 4  
Total payments to labour/3/value 
of output 
0.24*** 
(0.02) 
11.01 -2.41** 
(1.19) 
2.02 
 
     
Notes:  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10 level, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.  
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.  
 
Table 10:  Impact of ITQs on the fishery costs  
 
Total fishing cost for the industry  ($million)   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
1997 $35,935 $27,834 $26,214 $25,134 
1998 $39,786 $30,949 $29,181 $28,003 
1999 $53,655 $42,263 $39,985 $38,466 
2000 $53,572 $43,126 $41,036 $39,644 
     
 
Cost savings per kg fish landed with a 1per cent increase in the total volume of quota traded 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
1997 $0.020 $0.025 $0.030 $0.033 
1998 $0.021 $0.027 $0.032 $0.035 
1999 $0.020 $0.026 $0.030 $0.033 
2000 $0.018 $0.023 $0.028 $0.030 
     
 
